If firm level corporate governance affects firm market value (the price of minority shares) or overall firm value, what are the channels through which it does so? Prior work in emerging markets provides evidence of an association between corporate governance and firm market value, more limited evidence of a causal relationship, but very little evidence on the channels through which governance may affect value, and whether the effect is only on share price, or on overall firm value. We first confirm the association between governance and value using panel data on Korean public companies over 1998-2004. Firms with higher scores on an overall Korean corporate governance index (KCGI) have higher Tobin's q; this result is driven by the board structure component of KCGI and, less strongly, by ownership parity and disclosure components. Shareholder rights and board procedure subindices are not significant. We then provide evidence on several possible channels. For firms with higher KCGI scores: (i) related party transactions are less adverse to firm value; (ii) firm profitability is more sensitive to shocks to industry profitability; (iii) capital expenditures are lower, but investment is more sensitive to profitability and growth opportunities; (iv) sales growth is lower; (v) profitability is more sensitive to growth opportunities; (vi) lagged board structure is associated with higher firm profitability; and (vii) dividends are higher, controlling for profits, and are more sensitive to profits. Board structure is associated with the first six channels; parity with the third, fourth, and sixth, and disclosure with the fifth. A 2SLS analysis (using 1999 legal rules which apply to large firms to instrument for board structure) offers evidence that the link between board structure and firm value, and between board structure and these channels, is likely to be causal. The first two channels are consistent with governance reducing wealth transfers to insiders; the remainder are consistent with governance affecting overall firm value.
Introduction
If firm level corporate governance affects firm value, through what channels does it operate? Prior work in a number of emerging markets provides evidence of an association between corporate governance and firm value, and more limited evidence that this relationship is likely to be causal. But there is very limited evidence on the channels through which governance affects value.
We contribute to the literature on the link between firm-level governance and firm value in two principal ways. First, we provide additional evidence on the connection in emerging markets between firm-level corporate governance and firm market value (proxied by Tobin's q),
Literature Review
To keep this review of manageable length, we focus on emerging markets, and put aside the large literature on whether there is a link between corporate governance and firm value in developed markets (e.g., Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson, 2006; Bruno and Claessens, 2007) . We focus on studies of firm-level governance, and put aside studies of country-level governance and event studies of changes in corporate governance rules. We emphasize studies which examine an overall measure of corporate governance, rather than a single attribute (such as ownership parity, board independence, or board size). We do not review cross-listing studies (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004) , or accounting studies which link governance to earnings management and informativeness.
Governance to Value Studies
A number of studies report an association between an overall measure of corporate governance and firm market value, usually proxied by Tobin's q. The principal cross-country studies are Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) . There are also singlecountry studies on Hong Kong (Cheung, Connelly, Limpaphayom and Zhou, 2007) ; Korea (Black, Jang and Kim, 2006a) ; India (Balasubramaniam, Black and Khanna, 2008) ; Russia (Black, 2001; Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006) ; and Thailand (Limpaphayom and Connelly, 2004 ).
However, most governance-to-value studies either lack time series data on governance, or have too little time variation to make firm fixed effects feasible and rely on pooled OLS regressions. Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006) is an exception. Studies which do not use fixed or at least random effects leave open the possibility that unobserved firm-level factors explain the observed connection between governance and value.
Several papers study share returns during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. Mitton (2002) finds better share price performance for better-disclosing firms in crisis-affected countries. Lemmon and Lins (2003) find higher returns for firms with low control-ownership disparity. Baek, Kang, and Park (2004) find both effects for Korean firms.
Channels Through Which Governance Affects Value
Studies of the channels through which governance may affect firms' market values or overall value are more limited. One needs, in effect, to first connect governance to firm value, and then to identify particular aspects of firm behavior which plausibly explain the governanceto-value connection. The studies cited in the previous section undertake the first task, of connecting governance to value. A number of studies undertake the second task, and find an association between aspects of governance and aspects of firm behavior. Very few do both.
All rely on cross-sectional data. Klapper and Love (2004) and Mitton (2004) report an association between the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) governance index and firm profitability; Klapper and Love also link this index to firm market value. However, the CLSA index is based on a 2001 survey of analysts, depends significantly on analysts' subjective views, and includes some questions which relate more to management quality than to governance. Thus, analysts might simply be giving higher scores to firms which have performed better. 1 Joh (2003) finds that Korean chaebol firms with high control-ownership disparity have lower profitability during the precrisis period. Black, Jang, and Kim (2006) find no contemporaneous connection for Korean firms between governance and profitability; however, Black and Kim (2008) find evidence of higher profitability for large firms several years after board structure reforms at these firms.
There is also evidence of a link between governance and dividend payout. Mitton (2004) , using the CLSA index, finds this link primarily in countries with strong investor protection. He also finds a stronger negative relationship between dividends and growth opportunities in firms with higher CLSA scores. Hwang, Park, and Park (2004) The CLSA questions are summarized in an Appendix to Klapper and Love (2004) .
Corporate Governance Service (KCGS) survey) and dividends, and that higher KCGS scores mitigates chaebol firms' tendency to pay out lower dividends. Liu and Lu (2007) find for Chinese firms that better governance is associated with less earnings management, and likely with lower levels of tunneling.
Related Research
This paper is part of a series on Korean corporate governance. In Black, Jang and Kim cross-sectional data, it was unclear which was preferable), and report evidence of (i) a governance-to-value association between KCGI and firm market value, and (ii) likely causation for large firms, using the large firm dummy instrument. Black and Kim (2008) show that large firm dummy is best understood as an instrument for Board Structure Subindex, rather than all of KCGI, and seek to tighten the causal link between the legal shock to Board Structure and an increase in large firms' market values, using a combination of empirical strategies. Black, Jang and Kim (2006b) examine the factors which predict firms' governance choices and find evidence of a large role for idiosyncratic choice.
In this paper, we extend the KCGI index back to before the 1999 legal shock to large firm governance, and forward to 2004, develop time-series evidence on the governance-tovalue relationship, and examine possible channels. Following Black and Kim (2008) , we use large firm dummy to instrument for Board Structure Subindex.
Index Construction, Data, and Identification

Index Construction and Data Sources
We construct a multi-year Korean corporate governance index (KCGI) from 1998 to 2004, covering the vast majority of public companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. KCGI (0 ~ 100) consists of five equally weighted subindices, for Board Structure, Ownership Parity, Disclosure, Shareholders Rights, and Board Procedure. The index relies in significant part on surveys of public firms conducted by the Korea Corporate Governance Service beginning in mid-2001, and then at year-ends thereafter. We use these surveys to construct KCGI at mid-2001, and year-ends 2001-2004 . We hand-collect the data needed to carry the index back to year-ends 1998-2000. We thus have governance measured at eight time points over this period. 2 We face some important challenges in constructing the multiyear index. We are able to use only elements which are available in each year. However, KCGS changed its survey questions each year, and for some questions switched in 2003-2004 from relying on survey responses to reviewing firms' public disclosures, even though disclosure is not required. We reduce loss of governance elements due to changes in the survey in several ways. For some elements, we hand-collect data from annual reports, charters, proxy statements, company websites, and other sources. To reduce the cost of hand-collection, we generally assume that firms which lacked a governance element in year t also lacked this element in previous years.
For example, we assume that firms with no audit committee in 2001 also had no audit committee in prior years. For elements for which KCGS changed its collection method after 2002, we assume either that a firm which had a governance element in 2002 also had it in 2003 or that a firm which lacked a governance element in 2003 also lacked this element in 2002, as seemed appropriate for the specific element.
For governance elements that became legally required during this period, we assume that firms comply with these requirements. For example, we assume that large firms and chaebolaffiliated firms require board approval of related-party transactions when legally required (these requirements came into force for firms within the top 10 chaebol in 2000, for large firms and firms within the top-30 chaebol in 2001, and for firms in business groups with group assets over 2 The first survey did not specify the time on which survey respondents should base their answers. We assume that the answers reflect governance at the time the survey was conducted (roughly mid-2001) . English language translations of the surveys are available from the authors on request.
2 trillion won in 2002). For board composition, we extract data from annual books published by the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA), which include the name, age, title, education, and affiliation of each director of a Korean public company.
Where hand-collection for a governance element is too costly or data is not publicly available, we extrapolate forward or backward data on that element in one year to an adjacent year for which that element is missing. This "element extrapolation" is necessary to construct the index for 1998-2000. We believe that element extrapolation is reasonably innocuous because we use firm clusters in all regressions to control for correlated observations of the same firm in different years; and rely on firm fixed and random effects specifications, which control for a time-invariant firm-level effect, so that only governance changes over time matter.
Extrapolation, if done with error (compared to the unobserved true state) should add noise to our results, but should not create bias. Table 1 provides details on our extrapolation and interpolation rules and on how we obtain each element for each year. Board Structure Subindex is composed of Board Independence Subindex (2 equally weighted elements, 0 ~ 10), and Board Committee Subindex (3 equally weighted elements, 0 ~ 10). Ownership Parity Subindex has a single element. The other subindices are equally weighted sums of the elements of each. If data on a subindex element is missing for a particular firm, we compute the subindex for that firm based on the average of the nonmissing elements. Share ownership for financial institutions comes from KSE. For non-financial firms, we use a database hand collected by one of us covering non-financial firms listed on the KSE from 1996 to 2001, which breaks down shareholdings into family (including the group controlling shareholder), affiliated firms, non-profit organizations, and company executives. Table 3 defines (Panel A) and gives summary statistics (Panel B) for the principal variables used in this study.
Methodological Issues
Research on the connection between corporate governance and firm value or performance faces a set of empirical challenges to identification. Several recent articles contend that because of these challenges, we still know little about how corporate governance affects share values or firm performance (e.g., Chidambaran, Palia and Zheng, 2006; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2007; Listokin, 2007; Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2007) .
One problem is the potential for reverse causation, in which firm performance predicts board structure, rather than vice versa. A second possible form of endogeneity involves optimal governance varying based on firm characteristics. A third possibility is that firms may use governance to signal good underlying attributes, but governance has no separate effect on value or performance.
A fourth problem is limited data. To firmly establish association, even without good identification, one would want to use panel data and firm fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics. Yet most research relies on cross-sectional regressions, either because time series data is not available or because there is too little time variation in governance to make firm fixed effects feasible. A fifth issue is omitted variable bias. Different aspects of governance are often positively correlated. Moreover, a wide range of firm characteristics could plausibly predict both board structure and firm value or performance. This concern is acute for cross-country studies, due to data limitations in the multicountry databases.
In this paper, we seek to directly confront these issues. Rich data on Korean firms, plus rapid post-crisis evolution in governance, make a panel data approach with firm fixed effects feasible. In our principal regressions, we use firm fixed effects to address unobserved time-invariant firm level factors, year dummies to address variation over time that is common to all firms, and an extensive battery of control variables to address time-varying factors. We use firm clusters to address the potential correlation between observations of the same firm in different years, and White's robust standard errors to address potential heteroskedasticity.
Instrument Validity
We are able to partly address identification. Before the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis, most Korean firms had no outside directors and only a few banks and majority stateowned enterprises (SOEs) had 50% outside directors. Legal reforms in 1998 required all public firms to have at least 25% outside directors. Further reforms in 1999 make it possible for firms to have board committees, including audit committees, and require large firms (assets > 2 trillion won, about $2 billion) and banks to have at least 50% outside directors, an audit committee, and an outside director nominating committee. The rules for large firms and banks came into force This legal shock to board structure allows us to identify the effect of the change in large firms' board structure with changes in Tobin's q and in firm performance. We define large firm dummy =1 if a firm is large, 0 otherwise. In an efficient market, investors should anticipate the effect of governance changes on firm behavior and value, so share prices should change in 1999, when the rules are adopted. Thus, in regressions with Tobin's q as dependent variable, we use We discuss the validity of this instrument in Black and Kim (2008) , and only summarize A harder question for instrument validity is whether Large Firm IV 1999 predicts Tobin's q directly or only indirectly through Board Structure Subindex. Large firm dummy is associated with firm size, which may directly predict firm value. We address this concern through regression discontinuity analysis (e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 1999) , in which we control separately for firm size. Tobin's q jumps discontinuously at the 2 trillion won regulatory threshold. This jump appears during the period in mid-1999 when the rules are adopted; it is absent before then, and stable afterwards. Moreover, the direct association between ln(assets) and Tobin's q is negative, both below and above the 2 trillion won threshold, while the association with Large Firm IV 1999 is large and positive. The negative coefficient on ln(assets) implies that larger firms do worse at turning asset dollars into market value dollars. It is unlikely that this measure of efficiency would decline with size both below and above 2 trillion won; jump at the 2 trillion won point where governance rules kick in, for reasons other than governance; and do so beginning in mid-1999 when the governance rules are adopted.
It is a close question whether one does better to understand our instrument as instrumenting for Board Structure Subindex, or for all of KCGI (or perhaps for KCGIOwnership Parity). As Table 2 , Panel B shows, Large Firm IV 2000 correlates most strongly with Board Structure, but also correlates positively with Disclosure, Board Procedure, and Shareholder Rights. The 1999 legal reforms directly affect only Board Structure, but firms which change their board could also change their practices in other areas, potentially in value enhancing ways, perhaps with a lag. We return to this issue below.
Some caveats are appropriate for our instrumental variable analysis. First, the coefficients on instrumented Board Structure Subindex should be understood as similar to the "average treatment effect on the treated" in a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis. They provide an estimate of the impact of the 1999 reforms on large firms. The predicted effect might differ for small firms which voluntarily adopt similar reforms. Third, we have no available instrument for the other subindices which predict Tobin's q. 4 Black and Kim (2008) find that board structure reforms predict similar changes in Tobin's q for large and small firms. Thus, the treatment effect on the untreated may be similar to its effect on the treated. Figure 1 shows histograms of KCGI at year-end 1998 and 2004. One can readily see the substantial change in governance between these two dates. This large time-variation in governance makes it feasible to obtain results from firm fixed effects regressions. In Figure 2 , the left set of charts show the time-trend in the mean values of KCGI and its subindices, separately for large firms and small firms. KCGI increases for both groups, but the increases is greater for large firms (see also the summary statistics in Table 2 
Linking Corporate Governance to Firm Market Value
KCGI and Board Structure Subindex Over Time
Association between Corporate Governance and Market Value
We begin our analysis in Table 4 by confirming, in a multiyear context with panel data, one of the main findings of BJK: There is a strong positive relationship between KCGI and firm market value, proxied by ln(Tobin's q). Table 4 includes the full set of control variables we use throughout this paper, most controls are suppressed in later tables.
Regression (1) shows results for KCGI with firm fixed effects and an unbalanced panel of firms. Results with a balanced panel (Regression (2)) are similar; the coefficient on KCGI is similar, and the t-statistic is somewhat lower, likely due to smaller sample size.
Ownership Parity Subindex has limited time variation, partly because we have data for a limited number of years. Thus, its role in governance may be suppressed in a fixed effects framework. Yet, in BJK and in a pooled OLS regression with year dummies, otherwise similar to Regression (1), Ownership Parity is strongly associated with firm market value. So as not to lose this effect, we report firm random effects results in Regression (3), while adding industry fixed effects based on 4-digit Korean Standard Industrial Classification codes. In regression (3), the "lambda" coefficient, which measures the relative weight of within and between estimates (see Wooldridge, 2008, § 14 .2), gives 0.69 weight on the within estimate, so the random effects results should be close to fixed effects results. The coefficient on KCGI is somewhat larger, which could reflect the greater role played by Ownership Parity.
The random effects specification involves a compromise. Pooled OLS regressions will fully capture the role of Ownership Parity but will produce biased coefficients if there are important unobserved time-invariant firm effects. Fixed effects will correct this source of bias, but may produce a downward biased estimate of the effect of KCGI in general, as well as a poor estimate of the effect of Ownership Parity. The random effects specification reduces the bias in pooled OLS, especially with a large weight on the within estimate, while letting us partly capture the effect of "between" variation in Ownership Parity. Compare Zhou's (2001) criticism of the fixed effects to assess the effect of managerial share ownership on performance. A Hausman test rejects the null of equal coefficients for fixed and random effects regressions, but this does not tell us which approach is preferable, only that they are different.
In later regressions, we rely primarily on firm fixed effects results with unbalanced panels.
Fixed effects results with balances panels (not reported) and random effects results (mostly not reported) are similar. We report random effects results only: (i) in Table 7 (for these regressions, a Hausman test fails to reject the null of equal coefficients); and (ii) in Table 8 (where the significant results for Ownership Parity would disappear with fixed effects).
Except as otherwise specified, we report the contemporaneous relationship between the dependent variable and governance.
With fixed effects, this means examining the contemporaneous relationship between change in the dependent variable and change in governance. Our IV results involve a partial lag, since we set Large Firm In unreported robustness checks, we find similar, though usually slightly weaker results, if we lag governance by a year to allow for a lagged effect of governance on performance.
We use ln(Tobin's q) as our principal measure of firm value. Taking logs reduces the influence of high-q outliers. In this and later regressions, we identify and drop outliers for each year if a studentized residual from a regression of the dependent variable (here ln(Tobin's q)) on the principal independent variable (here KCGI) is greater than ± 1.96. In unreported robustness checks, we obtain similar results: if we do not take logs, retain outliers; or winsorize outliers instead of excluding them. We also find a strong association between KCGI and two alternate measures of firm value: (market value of equity)/(book value of equity); and (market value of equity)/sales.
In regression (1), the 0.0035 coefficient on KCGI is both statistically highly significant (t = 5.27) and economically meaningful. It implies that a worst-to-best change in KCGI (roughly 80 points) predicts a 0.28 increase in ln(Tobin's q) (using the sample median of 0.80 for Tobin's q) and a 96% increase in share price (using the sample median of 0.53 for debt/assets).
In regressions (4) and (5) and a 61% increase in share price (using the sample medians for Tobin's q and debt/assets).
Disclosure Subindex is also significant, and Ownership Parity Subindex is significant with random effects. The Board Procedure and Shareholder Rights subindices are not significant.
Comparing fixed to random effects, the coefficients are similar for all subindices except
Ownership Parity, which suggests that we do not introduce large bias for these subindices by using random effects instead of fixed effects.
The fixed and random effects results in Table 4 are consistent with the prior research on emerging markets discussed in Section 2.1, but are nonetheless an important extension of that research. With one exception, the Black, Love, and Rachinsky (2006) study of Russia, prior work relies only on cross-sectional results, and thus may not be reliable.
Instrumental Variable Results
We also use Large Firm IV 1999 to instrument for Board Structure Index, in a firm fixed effects, two stage least squares (2SLS) framework. Regression (6) is the first stage. Large
Firm IV 1999 is a strong predictor of Board Structure Subindex, as expected. Regression (7) is the second-stage. Board Structure Subindex remains a strong predictor of Tobin's q, with a higher coefficient than in regression (3). Disclosure subindex weakens slightly, but remains marginally significant. The board structure results are consistent with Black and Kim (2008) .
Channels through which Governance Affects Firm Value
We turn in this Section 5 to the channels through which governance may affect firm market value or overall firm value. We focus our attention on KCGI and on the subindices --Board Structure, Ownership Parity, and Disclosure --that predict higher market value. We treat Board Procedure and Shareholder Right subindices, which do not predict firm market value, as control variables.
Related-Parity Transactions
Related party transactions (RPTs), which benefit insiders but extract value from the firm, are a major risk facing outside investors in many countries, including Korea. For Korea, see Korean firms are required to disclose in their annual financial statements amounts owed to the firm by affiliated firms (including receivables), debts owed to affiliated firms (including payables), purchases (sales) of goods and services from (to) affiliates, and purchases (sales) of assets from (to) affiliates. We have data on total volume of RPTs with all affiliates taken together, but do not have data on pricing, or on transactions between particular pairs of related firms. Thus, we cannot assess which RPTs are with other firms in which the insiders own a larger (smaller) percentage stake.
5
In Table 5 , we examine RPTs involving purchases and sales of goods and services. In regression (1), there is a significant negative coefficient on Related Party
Transactions, defined as (related party purchases + sales)/sales, winsorized at 99% to reduce the impact of high outliers. We obtain similar results in unreported regressions for related party sales and related party purchases considered separately. Thus, investors assign lower value to firms with high levels of RPTs, even after controlling for profitability.
Regression (2) shows our first main channel result. The negative relationship between level of RPTs and Tobin's q is weaker for firms with higher KCGI. The coefficient on an 5
Preventing or reducing the value impact of large-scale RPTs, such as the mergers studied by Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) or the equity issuances studied by Baek, Kang and Lee (2006) , could be an important channel through which governance affects market value, but it is a channel we cannot measure because these transactions are too infrequent. Bae, Kang and Kim found 107 related-party mergers over 17 years (~6 per year). Baek, Kang and Lee found 60 equity offerings over 12 years (5 per year). They found a larger number of offerings of convertible bonds or bonds with warrants, but Korean legal reforms in 1997 limit the number and dilutive effect of these offerings during our sample period. In unreported regressions, higher KCGI does not predict fewer related party purchases and sales. One way to understand these results is to hypothesize that routine RPTs involving purchase and sale of goods and services are not inefficient on average, but some are priced to benefit insiders (or that investors so fear). Good governance may improves pricing (or perceived pricing), while otherwise leaving alone the potentially efficient transactions between related firms. The apparent channel runs from better pricing of routine RPTs to higher share price. This channel implies higher share prices and lower private benefits for insiders, but not necessarily higher firm value.
In Regression (3), we focus on Board Structure Subindex and its interaction with In Regression (4), we switch to 2SLS and use Large Firm IV 1999 to instrument for Board Structure Subindex. In this and later tables, we report only the second stage of 2SLS; the table heading gives the coefficient on the instrument from the first stage regression. In this and later regressions where we instrument for Board Structure Subindex and examine interaction effects, we implement our overall regression discontinuity design by controlling for both ln(assets) and the interaction between ln(assets) and the relevant variable (here Related Party Transactions). In regression (4), the interaction between Related Party Transactions and instrumented Board Structure Subindex is positive and significant.
The results for instrumented Board Structure Subindex are consistent with the 1999 reforms generating improved pricing of Related Party Transactions, but not through board structure alone. Instead, the new board structure leads to improved disclosure (as we saw in Figure 2 ), and perhaps to other governance changes, which have an overall effect on Related Party Transactions. Alternatively, since our IV results tell us only the predicted treatment effect on the treated (large firms), there could be differences between large and small firms in how board structure affects Related Party Transactions.
Tunneling
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) report evidence consistent with transfer of profits among firms in Indian business groups. The idea is to measure the responsiveness of firm profitability to shocks to industry profitability. Low responsiveness suggests that insiders extract more (fewer) potential profits as the firm does better (worse). We adapt their approach to our dataset, and assess whether the responsiveness of firm profits to industry shocks depends on governance. Table 6 presents our results. In regression (1), we confirm that firm profitability, measured by EBITDA/assets, correlates positively with industry profitability, in a firm fixed effects framework. We estimate industry profitability for a particular firm k in 4-digit industry I as [(EBITDA summed across all other firms in industry I)/(assets summed across these firms)]. Note that the coefficient on industry EBITDA/assets is 0.1043. In a similar regression which more precisely tracks the Bertrand et al. specification by using EBITDA not scaled by assets (with industry EBITDA defined as industry EBITDA/assets x (firm k's assets)), the coefficient on industry EBITDA is 0.69. Both values are well below 1 (perfect responsiveness), which suggests that some tunneling is occurring. 6 In Regression (2), we add KCGI and its interaction with industry EBITDA/assets. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. This is our second main channel finding: Firm profitability is more responsive to industry shocks for better-governed firms, suggesting lower levels of tunneling. The 0.004 coefficient on the interaction term implies that a worst-to-best change in KCGI (roughly 80 points) increases the responsiveness of firm profitability to industry profitability by 0.32, which is large relative to the 0.10 responsiveness found in regression (1).
In Regression (3), we replace KCGI and its interaction with industry profitability with inefficient firm operation. We lack the data to directly test whether tunneling moves profits from firms with lower insider ownership to related firms with higher insider ownership.
Investment
One likely reason why Korea was hit hard by the East Asian financial crisis in [1997] [1998] was investment and expansion by Korean firms without due consideration on profitability. Shin and Park (1999) find that chaebol firms invest more than non-chaebol firms during the pre-crisis period, despite poorer growth opportunities. Hong, Lee, and Lee (2007) also find pre-crisis overinvestment by chaebol firms, which disappears after the crisis. There is evidence of overinvestment for our sample as well. The mean (median) Tobin's q for our sample are only 0.86 (0.80), which implies that the mean (median) firm is turning a dollar of invested capital into less than dollar of market value. Tobin's q declines with firm size, suggesting that large firms are especially likely to invest. And investment is not significantly related to profitability (Table   7 , regressions (1)- (2)).
This evidence of overinvestment suggests that one channel through which governance may affect firm value is by limiting overinvestment. This would show up as a decrease in investment, and likely in growth, for better governed firms. This channel would likely imply increased firm value, not just reduced wealth transfers to insiders. Table 7 presents results for capital expenditures. We report both firm fixed effects (odd numbered regressions) and random effects results (even-numbered regressions) because, as will be seen in Table 8 , Ownership Parity Subindex partially drives the overall results for KCGI. We would largely lose the effect of Ownership Parity with fixed effects, due to limited time variation in this subindex. A Hausman test fails to reject the null of no difference in coefficients between the two approaches. This suggests that random effects is an appropriate specification, and perhaps the preferred one due to greater power. In regressions (1)-(2), we regress capital expenditures/assets on KCGI and control variables, including controls for EBIT/sales as a measure of profitability and Tobin's q (as a proxy for growth opportunities). The control variables are the same as in Table 4 , except we add EBIT/sales and Tobin's q, omit capex/PPE due to overlap with the dependent variable, and omit the following variables, which are relevant for firm value, but have no obvious connection to capital expenditures: share turnover, foreign ownership, ADR dummies, and MSCI dummy (the dummies drop out in any case with fixed effects). We find a negative coefficient on KCGI, consistent with better governance limiting overinvestment. The -0.0002 coefficient implies that a worst-to-best change in KCGI (roughly 80 points) predicts a 0.016 drop in Capex/assets, which is substantial compared to the sample median of 0.025. Do better-governed firms invest better, not simply less? If so, then we might expect investment to be more sensitive to profitability or growth opportunity for better-governed firms.
We test the first possibility in regressions (3)- (4), and the second in regressions (5)- (6), and both together in regressions (7)- (8). The key variables are the interactions between KCGI and EBIT/sales, and between KCGI and Tobin's q. The positive coefficients on the interaction terms are consistent with better governance predicting greater sensitivity of investment to both profitability and growth opportunities. For example, in regression (7), the -0.02257 coefficient on EBIT/sales and the +0.0005 coefficient on its interaction with KCGI in Regression (7) imply that investment responds positively to firm profitability when KCGI = 43 or higher, and that this positive responsiveness increases as KCGI moves above 43, which is close to the sample mean for 2002 and later years. Table 8 assesses which subindices of KCGI drive these results. We report only the coefficients for Board Structure and Ownership Parity subindices, other subindices are insignificant. We again report both fixed and random effects regressions, but unlike Table 7, a Hausman test now rejects the null of no difference in coefficients between fixed and random effects. In regressions (1)-(2) we replace KCGI with each subindex separately. Board Structure Subindex has a negative coefficient in both regressions. Ownership Parity Subindex is insignificant with fixed effects, but has a negative coefficient with random effects. Thus, two of the three subindices which drive the overall relationship between KCGI and Tobin's q in Table   4 also drive the drive the relationship between capex, on the one hand, and governance and its interactions with profitability and growth opportunity, on the other hand. In regressions (3) In regressions (5)- (8), we present results for interactions between subindices and profitability, and between subindices and Tobin's q. The interactions are generally insignificant (marginally significant for Board Structure*Tobin's q with random effects). Instrumented Board Structure Index is also insignificant (regressions not shown). This suggests that the positive interactions between KCGI as a whole and profitability and Tobin's q, in predicting capex, shown in Table 7 , derive from the combined effect of several subindices.
The results in Table 7 are our third main channel. Better governed firms appear to invest less, but invest better. This channel plausibly affects overall firm value, not just the division of that value between controlling and minority shareholders.
Sales Growth
If better governed firms invest less, do they also grow more slowly? This too might be value enhancing, if Korean firms otherwise tend to overexpand. Table 9 addresses that question. We report only fixed effects results because, unlike the capex results in Table 8 , we obtain similar results for Ownership Parity Subindex with either fixed or random effects.
Control variables are the same as for the capital expenditure regressions, except we add Capex/PPE and omit sales growth (5 year) due to overlap with the dependent variable.
In regression (1), we regress one year sales growth (from year t-1 to year t) on KCGI and control variables. KCGI takes a significant negative coefficient, consistent with better governed firms growing more slowly. In unreported regressions, we obtain similar results with 3-year sales growth, from t-1 through t+2, as the dependent variable. The -0.0023 coefficient on KCGI implies that a worst-to-best change in KCGI (roughly 80 points) predicts a 0.184 drop in sales growth, which is large relative to the sample median of 0.06.
In regression (2), we interact KCGI with profitability, to assess whether sales growth is more sensitive to profitability for better governed firms, but find no significant effect. In regressions (3) and (4), we assess which subindices predict the direct effect of KCGI on sales growth. The regressions are similar except that in regression (4), we instrument for Board Structure Subindex using Large Firm IV 2000. Ownership Parity takes a strong negative coefficient in both regressions; Board Structure is negative but not significant, whether instrumented for or not; and other subindices are also not significant.
In regressions (5) and (6), we assess, for the Ownership Parity and Board Structure subindices, whether sales growth is more sensitive to profitability for better governed firms.
The regressions are similar except that in regression (6), we instrument for Board Structure Subindex. For Ownership Parity Subindex, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant in both regressions. For Board Structure Subindex, the direct effect on sales growth remains negative and strengthens to roughly 5% significance in both regressions. The interaction between Board Structure Subindex and EBIT/sales is also significant at roughly 5% in both regressions. Table 9 is our fourth channel result. KCGI as a whole predicts slower growth, as does Ownership Parity Subindex and, less robustly, Board Structure Subindex. Revenue growth is more sensitive to profitability for firms with higher scores on Ownership Parity Subindex and, less robustly, Board Structure Subindex, but not for KCGI as a whole. This channel, like the capex channel, is consistent with better governance predicting higher firm value, not just reduced diversion of value by controlling shareholders.
Growth Opportunities and Profitability
Hutchinson and Gul (2004) report, for Australian firms, a negative direct association in cross-section between growth opportunities and profitability, which is ameliorated by better governance. We implement a fixed-effects variation of their approach in Table 10 . Control variables are the same as in Table 9 , except we include Tobin's q and omit EBIT/sales and EBIT/assets due to overlap with the dependent variable. In regression (1), higher Tobin's q (our proxy for growth opportunities) predicts higher profitability, measured as EBIT/assets. 7 In regression (2), we add KCGI, which is insignificant.
In Regression (3), we add an interaction between Tobin's q and KCGI. The interaction term is positive and significant, consistent with Hutchinson and Gul's principal result. The coefficient of -0.021 on Tobin's q implies that for a hypothetical firm with KCGI = 0, higher Tobin's q predicts lower profitability. When we combine this with the +0.0010 coefficient on the interaction term, the association turns positive for firms with KCGI > 21, which is well below the sample median for KCGI in the later years of our sample.
Regressions (4) The results in Table 10 are our fifth channel result. Governance, in particular better board structure, interacts positively with Tobin's q to predict profitability. This channel, like the capex and sales growth channels, is consistent with better governance predicting higher firm value, not just reduced diversion of value by controlling shareholders.
7
The positive coefficient on Tobin's q contrasts to the negative relationship between profitability and growth opportunities found by Hutchinson and Gul. This is not due to our use of firm fixed effects, versus their use of cross-sectional data. In a pooled OLS regression with year dummies, otherwise similar to regression (1), Tobin's q takes a coefficient of 0.0113 (t = 2.59), very close to the fixed effects coefficient of 0.0122 (t = 2.61).
Board Structure Subindex and Lagged Profitability
We saw in Table 10 that there is no contemporaneous relationship between KCGI or subindices and profitability. There is also no lagged relationship for KCGI as a whole (regressions not reported). However, as Table 11 shows, there is a relationship between lagged Board Structure Subindex and profitability. In regression (1), we regress EBIT/assets for year t on Board Structure Subindex for year t-2. Board Structure Subindex takes a significant positive coefficient. We obtain similar results in regression (2) Board Structure Subindex is comprised of two subsubindices, for Board Independence and Board Committees (audit, compensation, and nominating committees). In regression (3), we show that board independence is associated with profitability. There is no connection between Board Committee Subsubindex and profitability. This is a sensible result, given the principal functions of these committees. Table 11 , together with the DiD results for large firm profitability in Black and Kim (2008) , provides evidence of a sixth channel, running from lagged board independence to higher profitability. This channel is consistent with board independence predicting higher firm value, not just reduced diversion of value by controlling shareholders. However, the evidence for this channel is limited, since the channel does not appear to exist for KCGI as a whole.
Dividends
In Table 12 , we report evidence on whether KCGI is associated with dividend payout.
We report results for dividends/sales, but in unreported regressions obtain similar results for dividends/assets. In an unreported regression of dividends/sales on EBIT/sales and other control variables (dropping EBIT/assets as a control variable), the coefficient on EBIT/sales is positive but insignificant (coeff. = 0.00024, t = 1.06), indicating little if any overall relationship between dividends and profits. In regression (1), higher KCGI predicts higher dividends, controlling for profitability with EBIT/sales and EBIT/assets as separate control variables.
The 0.00008 coefficient on KCGI implies that a worst-to-best change in KCGI (roughly 80 points) predicts a 0.006 increase Dividend/Sales, comparable to the sample median of 0.005.
In Regression (2), we find a positive interaction between KCGI and EBIT/sales, in predicting dividends/sales. Thus, dividends are more sensitive to profits for better governed firms.
In regressions (3)- (4), we assess which subindices drive these results. In regression (3), we replace KCGI with each subindex separately; in regression (4) These results are our seventh channel: Higher KCGI predicts both higher dividends on average, controlling for profits, and greater sensitivity of dividends to profits, with Disclosure Subindex as the principal subindex that generates these results. Dividend payout could be associated with higher firm value, not just higher value of minority shares, to the extent it results in increased capital market discipline on the managers of more profitable firms.
Conclusion
We develop a broad Korean corporate governance index (KCGI) index, and extend the cross-sectional results in Black, Jang and Kim (2006) , to a multiyear, firm fixed effects framework: Higher KCGI predicts higher firm market value. This result is driven principally by Board Structure Subindex and, to a lesser extent, by Ownership Parity and Disclosure subindices. The board structure results become stronger if we instrument for Board Structure Subindex using as an instrument a 1999 legal shock to the board structures of large firms, suggesting that the board structure results are likely to be causal for large firms.
We then investigate the channels through which governance might produce either (i) higher firm market value without higher overall firm value, through reduced private benefits flowing to insiders; or (ii) more efficient operation, and hence an increase in overall firm value.
We find evidence of both effects. We find evidence for a number of potential channels. For firms with higher KCGI: (i) related party transactions are less adverse to firm value; (ii) firm profitability is more sensitive to shocks to industry profitability, suggesting reduced tunneling by insiders; (iii) capital expenditures are lower (against background evidence that many Korean firms overinvest), but investment is more sensitive to profitability and growth opportunities; (iv) sales growth is lower; (v) profitability is more sensitive to growth opportunities; (vi) lagged board structure (but not KCGI as a whole) predicts higher profitability; and (vii) dividends are higher, controlling for profits, and are more sensitive to profits. The first two channels are consistent with governance producing reduced insider tunneling of profits; the remainder are consistent with governance producing higher overall firm value.
Board Structure Subindex is associated with all except the last channel. The board structure results survive if we instrument for Board Structure Subindex, which provides evidence on causality. Ownership Parity is associated with the third, fourth, and sixth channels, and disclosure with the sixth. The Shareholder Rights and Board Procedure subindices of KCGI are not associated with overall firm market value, nor with these channels.
The connection between which subindices which predict firm market value, and which predict specific channels, is consistent with these channels underlying at least part of the overall relationship between governance and firm market value. (i) if an element is available in year X, but not in year X+1 (X-1), we extrapolate year X value to year X+1 (X-1).
We interpolate for missing firms and missing elements using the following rules applied sequentially: (i) if a firm answers the KCGS survey in years X and X+2, but not year X+1, we use in year X+1 the average of the X and X+2 values; and (ii) if an element is available in years X and X+2, but not year X+1, we use in year X+1 the average of the X and X+2 values. We assume elements are present if they are legally required. Italics indicate legally required elements.
For hand-collection, we generally collect values in year X only for firms which had this governance element in year X+1. Thus, for compensation committee, we have KCGS data starting in 2002. We hand collect data for 2001 for firms which had this committee in 2002, collect data for 2000 for firms which had this committee in 2001, etc. For some elements, a change in KCGS methodology led to inconsistency between responses for different years. For these questions, we either replace a 1 value in year X with 0 if the X+1 value is 0, or replace a 0 value in year X with 1 if the X+1 value was 1, as seemed appropriate given the nature of the element. Details on these and other adjustments to the KCGS raw data are available from the authors on request. 
